

31
SECOND THOUGHTS
ON THE
GERMAN WAR:

Or a FULL and COMPLETE
ANSWER
TO A LATE
PAMPHLET

ENTITLED
OCCASIONAL THOUGHTS
ON THE
PRESENT GERMAN WAR,

By the Author of the CONSIDERATIONS on
the same Subject.

L O N D O N:

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OF RYMA N. H. 1712

A. N. S. W. E. R.

TO A. N. S. W. E. R.

F. A. M. P. H. E. T.

OF RYMA N. H. 1712

ON THE

PRESENT GERMAN WAR

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ANSWER

To a Late

PAMPHLET, &c.

AFTER the various Contests about Resignation, the many Ministerial and Anti-ministerial Pamphlets, which have appeared, (for the most Part replenished with more Scurrility than Truth, and more Sophistry than Reasoning) we have at length seen the Ghost of the long-departed 'Considerations upon the *German War*.' To lay this Spirit, not of Party, but of Prejudice and Misconstruction, false Deductions, erroneous and contradictory Reasonings; I, a Volunteer in the Service of polemical Writings, have taken up the Pen; but I must ac-

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knowledge

knowledge I am at some Loss at which End to begin, or whether I had not better drop the Pen of an Author, and take up that of a Transcriber, in order to quote the different Passages of this heterogeneous Piece, in order to state and confute itself.

This extraordinary Performance begins with an Advertisement, which is to assign Reasons why the Author does not publish a Second Part of the Considerations upon the *German War*; which, in one Word, is, *because he is known to be the Author of them*: He then adds a *Postscript* to those former Considerations, then begins his *Occasional Thoughts upon the same Subject*, (which are not to be considered as *Considerations*) and reconsiders his Arguments in the prior Piece. --- Then continues his *Occasional Thoughts*; then adds his Additions, or *Addenda*, to confute his Antagonist's Confutations; and then continues his *Occasional Thoughts* again.

Such a motly and extraordinary Performance, surely, never before issued from the Press, and would require the Assistance of an able Commentator to explain what he means. It is true, I have read him with
some

some Attention, and apprehend I understand partly what he intends; this, and the rest that I guess at, I will endeavour to explain as far as my Capacity will admit of.

He begins, as I said before, with a *Post-script*, to prove, that we cannot *over-conquer ourselves*; that we should not give up *Guadalupe* to the *French*, as our other Islands do not produce more Sugars than are necessary for our own Consumption; and to animadvert upon the Necessity of keeping all the *Newfoundland* Fishery to ourselves, which will otherwise turn out a Nursery to *French* Seamen.

As I shall endeavour to agree with this Gentleman in every thing that wears the least Face of Reason, I shall not enter into a close Disquisition upon the first Point, upon which so much may be said on both Sides. With regard to the second, I shall only ask, from whence arose our Exports of Sugar before we were in Possession of *Guadalupe*? We certainly did not purchase them of the *French*, at high Prices, to sell them again to the *Germans*, and others, to be Losers. I believe our Custom-house Books will set this

Mat-

Matter in a clear Light; and prove, that many thousand Hogheads are annually exported of the Growth of *Jamaica, Barbadoes, St. Kitts, &c.* And there is no-body better acquainted with this, than the Considerer and Occasional Thinker.

As to the third Object, I do not know that we ever intended letting the *French* have any Part of the Island of *Newfoundland*; but it will be difficult to prevent their fishing in the Seas, whilst they have any Vessels capable of serving in that Capacity.

Mr. *M---d---t* begins his Occasional Thoughts [I mean, such of them as are new] in this Manner: ' We were not to conquer *Martico*, an Island which would yield us the ' largest Returns, and would liberally pay us ' for the Expence of keeping it; for fear of ' *over-conquering ourselves*; and yet we now ' know, that, at that Time, and for several ' Months after, the Public was amused with ' an Expedition against another Island; ' which, having only a bad Road, and no ' Harbour, could answer no one good purpose, and tended only to divide our Force, ' and multiply our Expence; and which was ' there-

‘ therefore a Conquest of that very Kind,
 ‘ which has the most direct Tendency to
 ‘ hurt us.’*

I presume this Gentleman, who acknowledges himself already known, either forgets, or chuses to forget, that we have never lost Sight of the Conquest of *Martinico*, against which there has been planning, and is now executing, an Enterprize, which must, in all human Probability, submit it to our Arms. With Respect to *Belleisle*, which is here meant by ‘ another Island,’ it certainly was a great Dishonour to the *French* to lose an Island situated under their very Nose, and which they had repeatedly declared impregnable; besides, it must certainly be of eminent Advantage to us in Time of War, being the Key of the *Bay of Biscay*, and commanding most of their Ports of consequence, particularly *Nantes*, *Port l’Orient*, and *Rochelle*, which are their Ports of greatest Trade to the *East* and *West Indies*. He, nevertheless, calls it ‘ A Conquest, which we see, by the Negotiations, our Enemies laugh at us for
 ‘ having

‘ having made, and will scarce take again,
 ‘ when we offer it them.’ The Reason the
French make so flight of receiving *Belleisle*, is
 because it was to be exchanged for *Minorca*,
 (their capital Conquest this War) which
 though it be of no great Advantage to them;
 is of more Importance to us; and they would,
 therefore, expect a greater Equivalent than
Belleisle.

The Occasional Thinker, now chuses to
 suppose the Argument given up, that there
 is any Plea for making a Diversion in *Ger-*
many in Favour of our Conquests; and he
 goes on begging the Question, that it must
 be to divert the *French* from making a De-
 scent here. Upon this Occasion he is very
 witty upon the late M---r, whom he repre-
 sents as frighten’d at the Spectre of an Invasion,
 of which he would never allow, in Times of
 more real Danger, any Substance.

In the Course of this ludicrous Argument,
 he thus animadvert. ‡ ‘ Only one Regiment
 ‘ has been sent to the *East Indies*; and notwith-
 ‘ standing the superior Advantages we have
 ‘ for sending Ships and Men thither, all our
 ‘ Suc-

' Successes in those Parts have been obtained
 ' with an inferior Force. Whilst six Millions
 ' have been spent in the *German War*, twenty
 ' thousand Pounds only *has* been voted
 ' for the *East Indian*. The falling State of
 ' our Funds, and of our Treaty, both shew
 ' what this *German Diversion* tends to.' A close
 Disputant would here enter, first into the
 Merits of the last *Indian Monopoly*, prove
 it to be a disadvantageous Trade to *England*,
 carrying out our Specie and Bullion for un-
 wholesome Herbs, and crackery Ware, and
 that the Company's War is no way National,
 but equally prior as abstracted; but I shall
 even wave these Considerations, which may
 be so copiously animadverted upon, in sup-
 posing Mr. *M--d--t* immediately interested
 in the Fate of the *India Company*, and that
 he would prefer the Security of *Madras* to that
 of *Hanover*.

He thus continues: ' Whatever may have
 ' been the Case before, yet now that the
 ' *French Marine* is totally sunk, should any
 ' one affirm, that a *German War* is ne-
 ' cessary for us as a Diversion; when then is
 ' it to become less necessary? Or when are we

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' to

‘to be without it?’ I answer; when we have reduced *Louisiana* and *Martinico*; Conquests of some Importance, I imagine, though they are not in the *East Indies*; and though the occasional Thinker has taken no Notice of the first.

Mr. *M--d--t*, in the Course of this Chapter, Section, Division, or whatever Name he pleases to give it, (for really I do not know what to call it) has called forth all his Wit, Humour and Spleen, to make the late *M---* look ridiculous, and prove, that an Invasion is nothing but a Bastard Child of Fear or Phrenzy. With Respect to the latter Opinion, I would willingly join with him, and sincerely hope and wish the *French* may never make any Attempt on this Island, or in our Ports, that may prove successful: But when we consider the present desperate Situation of that People, and the high Notions they entertain of Glory and Honour, it is not improbable to imagine they may try some desperate Stroke, in order to wipe off some Part of that Ignominy which has fallen upon their Arms and their Councils. We know that a *French* Minister never considers the Loss that
any

any Attempt will cost his Country, farther than to suppute it upon Paper, and procure the Means : He feels no Remorse at sacrificing twenty Thousand Men for his own imaginary Fame. All History, all Anecdotes, ancient and modern, concur in this Sentiment. If to this we add the late, and present Regulations, that have been made to put their Navy upon a formidable Footing, and the various Preparations that are now going on in their different Ports, particularly *Brest*, * there is great Reason to believe they are meditating some uncommon Blow, either upon our Coasts, or against our Fleets.

To pursue our Writer's *novel Thoughts*, we must skip over his *Addenda* to the Considerations upon the *German War*, and proceed to Page 31, where, after having informed us that the foregoing Notes were all wrote and

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printed

* There is a Skiff, or Machine, of a very extraordinary Nature, constructed, and now in experiment, at this Port; which is supposed to be intended for firing a Fleet in Harbour. It is shaped like a Dolphin, big enough to contain one Person, who, after having executed his Design, is to swim back to the Place, or Ship, from whence he came. There are Lodgments made in it for Combustibles, and it has a Grapple in front.

printed the last Sessions, he presently goes on with saying, ‘ There is a Mode and Fashion
 ‘ in thinking, which is apt to hurry Men out
 ‘ of the Possession of their better Judgment.
 ‘ But seven Years ago the very Thought of
 ‘ sending our Troops into *Germany*, would
 ‘ not have been borne. Is there any intelli-
 ‘ gent Man living, who, if at that Time he
 ‘ had been asked, whether it would be right
 ‘ for *Britain* singly to engage in a Land War
 ‘ with *France*, *Germany* and *Sweden*, would
 ‘ have thought the Proposer of such a Quest-
 ‘ ion mad, and turned from him with the
 ‘ utmost Disdain?’

I am quite of Mr. *M--d--t*’s Opinion in this Respect, that none but a Lunatic would have thought of sending our Troops to *Germany* any Time in the Year 1754, at a Period that the Empire was in a perfect State of Tranquility, and we were in peace with *France* and all the World.

The next Objects of his Spleen form no inconsiderable Triumvirate; he at once attacks the King of *Prussia*, the *British* Parliament and the *German* Princes. These are his Words. ‘ Have we not, for three Springs
 ‘ fol-

following, since our *German* General took
 the Command, seen Enterprizes formed by
 him, every one of which have miscarried:
 The first, it was said, by his own Delay;
 the next by that of a *Hanoverian* General;
 and the last by the Treachery of another Al-
 ly, who never yet kept his Faith with us;
 and every one of which, if they had suc-
 ceeded, could not have brought the least
 Benefit to this Country; but each of them
 had a direct Tendency to amuse the Parlia-
 ment then sitting, to exhaust the Treasury,
 by a Drain of two or three hundred Thou-
 sand Pounds a Month, and to give the *Ger-*
man Court an Opportunity to take Advan-
 tages of our Necessities, and raise their De-
 mands upon us.

At the same Time that he tells us the most
 adviseable Measures for the Allies, will be to
 finish the War by a Retreat to *Stade*, and sign
 a similar Convention to that of *Hastenbeck*;
 he, nevertheless, seems greatly disturbed that
 Prince *Ferdinand* has not destroyed the *French*
 every Spring since the Battle of *Minden*.—I
 know not whether he pays a worse Compli-
 ment to the Integrity of our General, or that
 of

of the King of *Prussia*; or whether the Want of Discernment in our Parliament is equal to the Probity of the *German* Courts; but be these Divisions as they may, there is no small presumptive Vanity in supposing, that one single *Considerer's Head* should have more Penetration, than five hundred chosen Representatives from the whole Body of the People.

Here follow many curious Animadversions upon false Oeconomy, and many more as curious Extracts from the printed Votes, containing the Sums granted for continuing the War; all which are brought to prove, that it is a great Expence to the Nation. ---- I imagine there are but few Men unacquainted with this before, and he might have saved himself the Trouble of transcribing all these Grants, without the Public's being a whit the less Master of the Subject.

In Page 48 he resumes the Argument, in considering how far a Balance of Power in *Europe* is real, or imaginary. These are his Words: ' So long as this Concern for the
' Balance of Power in *Europe* was subsisting
' in the Minds of the Chief States of it, it
' was certainly the Intent of *Britain* to keep
' up

‘ up the additional foreign Guard against our
 ‘ most dangerous Rival; but now the several Powers of the Continent, and all the
 ‘ *German* Courts, are so totally disjointed;
 ‘ and we have been so long making ourselves
 ‘ Parties in their separate Quarrels, that there
 ‘ is not the least Hope of seeing any general
 ‘ Union of *Europe* against the *French*: Nay,
 ‘ we have been so long affecting to shew our
 ‘ Riches and Influence, and have, by Turns,
 ‘ made every Power in *Europe* so much our
 ‘ Enemies, that they seem to be as jealous of
 ‘ us as *France*; and, instead of our holding
 ‘ the Balance of Power between them and
 ‘ *France*, they are now watching for it between *France* and us. Tho’ therefore that
 ‘ old Principle, That *Britain* had nothing to
 ‘ do with the Continent, was certainly
 ‘ wrong, while the States of it were really
 ‘ united with us, and with each other; yet
 ‘ now, that all the Powers of the Continent
 ‘ have renounced us, it was certainly right.’

---- If so, whence our present Alliance with
Prussia, or our Engagements with *Hesse-Cassel*, *Brunswick*, *Wolfenbuttle*, &c? Surely,
 if it could ever be the Interest of *England* to
 enter

enter into foreign Connections, in order to preserve the Balance of Power in *Germany*, at a Time that *Austria* and *France* were dis-united, and must appear nearly a Match for each other, at least in the Empire; it must be more immediately our Interest to interfere at present for the Preservation of that Balance, when those two great Powers are united, and the King of *Prussia* stands singly in the Gap, to oppose, not only them, but even *Russia* and *Sweden*, as well as many of the petty Princes of *Germany*.

I say, if there ever was such a Thing existing, as a Balance of Power in *Germany*, and it was the Interest of *England* to see it properly poised, our Assistance was never so necessary, to prevent its being totally destroyed, as at present: When, to lay aside all religious Concerns, (but as far as they have a political Influence) the *Protestant* Cause is at the lowest Ebb, has the fewest Defenders, and the most Opponents. If the Empress Queen, by the Assistance of *France*, were to succeed so far as to crush the King of *Prussia*, (which they certainly must, without our Intervention) we might reasonably expect to see,

see, by the Time the Peace took Place, a second Reformation in *Germany*, and all the *Protestant* Princes follow the Example of the young Prince of *Hesse*, in re-embracing Popery: I do not know how far its Influence might extend, even to *Sweden* and *Denmark*; and as we would then be the only great *Protestant* Power in *Europe*, though I would not suspect the *Dutch*, so tenacious of their Religion, even in *Japan*, would swerve from their present Profession, through an interested Influence: We should be looked upon as the only *heretical* State; and I know not how far the Phrenzy, Bigotry, but more particularly Ambition, of some Powers might extend to form a general religious Alliance against us.

These Thoughts may, at first, appear chimerical; and, I hope, in their full Extent they are; but supposing such Measures were, in any Degree, to take Place; the ill Consequences that would result to us from them, would be in the same Proportion: So that if the King of *Prussia*, only, were entirely destroyed as a crowned Head, *Silesia* revert to the Empress-Queen, and *Brandenburg*, and his other Possessions, become Popish States, we must necessarily in the then Proprietor of

those Dominions, find an implacable Enemy, who, joined to *France, Austria, Russia* and *Sweden*, would produce such a formidable Alliance, as, I am afraid, all our naval Force, great as it is, would not be able to successfully oppose; more especially as we should not then have one Friend in *Germany*, who could be of any Service to us; and we might too late discover, that a continental Diversion, not only necessary for promoting our Success elsewhere, but also for amusing the Attention of the great Powers of *Europe*, who would, at any Rate, endeavour to be our Rivals in Trade, Glory and Riches.

With what Ease our *occasional Thinker* can make Distinctions, where they are necessary for his Argument; and how readily he can confound Matters where they suit his Purpose. ' By the Treaty of *Closter-Seven*, the first
' *German War* was brought to an End. *Eng-*
' *land* was absolutely released from all Con-
' cern with it, by the express Act of all the
' *German Parties*. Now, therefore, we are
' engaged in two Wars, which are totally
' distinct from each other: A *British War*,
' and a *German War*, a War of Necessity,
' and a War of Choice; a War of Acquisition,
' and a War of Expence. The very laudable
' Pre-

' Prejudices of the late Reign, the interested
 ' Views of Courtiers, and the crest-bearing
 ' Influence of particular Planters, have jointly
 ' conspired to make us confound these two
 ' Wars with each other ; and the Want of
 ' distinguishing them has betrayed us into an
 ' Expence of forty Millions to ruin *Germany*,
 ' and to serve no one good *British* Purpose,
 ' nor indeed to serve the Interest of any one
 ' Court in *Germany*, except that of *Berlin*. Now,
 ' that the *French* Navy is destroy'd, there is
 ' not the least Connection between our *British*
 ' War and our *German* one. They are as se-
 ' parable from each other, as any two Wars
 ' *England* can be engaged in ; as distinct as a
 ' *Spanish* War and a *Swedish*. Make but this
 ' Distinction, and the National Interest will
 ' immediately point out what ought to be
 ' done. Party-men, on each Side, chuse to con-
 ' found these two together, each that they may
 ' find a Pretence to condemn the Conduct of
 ' their Adversaries, and to justify their own.*

The *German* War, and the *British* War, are
 two distinct Wars ; but there is, according to
 our Autho, a strict Connection between our
East-Indian War and our *American* War, and
 they should be equally supported by the Go-
 vernment ; though the one was undertaken

long before we had any *real* Quarrel with *France*, to suit the Caprice of the *East-India* Company, (the Compatibility of whose Interest, and that of the Nation, has long been contested) and promote their private Advantages; and the other to rescue our Colonies from the Infractions of the *French*; the Interest and Advantages whereof to the Mother-Country have never been doubted by any Man in his Senses. This is clearly evinced in the late Negotiation, by the Attention and Jealousy which is shewn by each Nation, with respect to their *American* Concerns; and the Carelessness with which they treat those of their respective *East-India Companies*, leaving the Decision of their Differences to themselves.

In Page 53, he thus proceeds in his Argument. ' In short, if *Britain* be a free Sovereignty, Providence has now put it in our Power to support our own War as long as we please; and bring our Enemies to what Terms we please, which I hope will be moderate ones. If, on the other Hand, this Country is made only for the Defence of another, which it cannot protect, we must then struggle on a little longer, till our Money, or Patience shall be exhausted; but the Terms of Peace will be of
' our

' our Enemy's prescribing, and not ours;
 ' and our Enemies, will, after that, ever hold
 ' us in Thralldom, with the Fear of Evils,
 ' which they know we must not suffer, and
 ' cannot prevent.' Were we then to desert
 our Allies at this Period we have it so much
 in our Power to dictate to our Enemies,
 what Excuse could we plead? Not Necessity,
 nor advantageous Proposals on their Part.
 We must, by such a Conduct, counter-say all
 we have urged, so vehemently urged, with
 Respect to the Advantages we have gained,
 and acknowledge it is not in our Power to
 continue the War in the Manner we began it,
 though the necessary Supplies for the next
 Year were actually subscribed and raised.
 Would not this be an excellent Handle for our
 Enemies to disavow all their former Proposals
 of Peace that were advantageous to us, and
 prescribe to us such Terms as they should
 think suitable to our dejected State? It would
 not be *Guadalupe*; or the Liberty of Fishing in
America, that would satisfy them then:---
 they would not talk of Exchanges and Equi-
 valents; they would, in all likelihood, insist
 upon *Canada*, and support their former forged
 Claims upon our Back Settlements.

' The Nation is now threatened with a
 ' *Spanish*

' *Spanish* War. God forbid that we should
 ' court it; but if we are at liberty to pursue
 ' only the *British* Interest, we can have no
 ' Reason to fear it. Were the *French* Marine
 ' in its full Vigour, such as it was in the Be-
 ' ginning of the last War, and of this, and
 ' such as it will be against the next War, if
 ' we neglect the proper Means to secure our-
 ' selves; the Addition of the *Spanish* Marine
 ' to it, would, in that Case, be a just Ground
 ' of Concern. But can those Men really fear
 ' a *Spanish* War, in which now, that the
 ' Marine of *Spain* must be unsupported by
 ' that of *France*, we can have nothing to fear,
 ' and must have every thing to hope for; and
 ' yet wantonly run the Nation into an Ex-
 ' pence of ten Millions for a *German* Quarrel,
 ' in which we have not the least Concern,
 ' and from which not the least Good can re-
 ' sult to *Britain*? Can Men be really afraid of
 ' meeting a weaker Power than themselves at
 ' Sea; and yet go to *Germany*, to seek out a
 ' Power at Land, which is in itself stronger
 ' than we, and is supported by all the other
 ' Powers of *Europe* beside? †

Either a *Spanish* War is eligible, or not eli-
 gible: We have either some Cause to go to
 War

War with *Spain*, or we have not. If a *Spanish* War is eligible, let us enquire who are the Persons likely to be Gainers by it? We cannot suppose that we shall gain one Inch of Ground from the *Spaniards*, which we shall retain at the Time of a Peace; and as to their Navy, our Author represents it in so despicable a State, that it is hardly worth taking to add to our own, and much less the Expence of Powder and Ball, which will be necessary for its Destruction. Is it Glory we would acquire in a *Spanish* War?---The *Spaniards* were never famous for being good Soldiers, and we have already gained more Laurels than we can change for a good and lasting Peace. No, no, it is their Money;---their Doubloons and Pieces of Eight are permanent Acquisitions, and solid Gain: But who are the People that will, in all likelihood, be the Acquirers of this Money? The Proprietors of Privateers, who are languishing for a *Spanish* War, that their Ships may no longer rot in Port, but turn out to some Advantage. So the Nation is to run herself ten or twelve Millions more in debt in the Pursuit of a *Spanish* War, in order to furnish a few avaricious Individuals with the Opportunity of gaining amongst them all, perhaps, half a Million,
and

and which, at the greatest Certainty, is but a Lottery.

But we must have some Pretence for commencing Hostilities against the *Spaniards*, besides the Thirst of Gain. They have publicly disowned *Buffy's* Representations on their Part; and their Conduct, in the *West Indies*, is a corroborating Proof of their Integrity. We have scarce heard of any Misunderstanding between us and the *Spaniards*, in that Part of the World, since the Beginning of the War; and surely Prudence and common Sense would induce us sooner to give Credit to Facts, and the solemn Declaration of the *Spanish* Ministry, than to the Insinuations of a *French* Emisary, whose Errand here was, in part, to sow Sedition and Discontent.

But let us consider Mr. *M--d--t* in the full Scope of his Argument, which is to give Place to the following Deduction. ' On the other
' Hand, can any Man, who thinks a *Spanish*
' War unavoidable, persist, even singly to
' advise the charging ourselves with new
' Expences, even in those Parts of a *German*
' War which are unavoidable, and which we
' may indisputably, with good Faith, refuse.'
Does he not believe, in Case a *Spanish*
War should take Place, whilst that between
us and *France* continues (for we must not hint
at

at that in Germany) that if France had no Occasion to employ 80 or 100 thousand Troops in the Empire, they would not be more able to assist the Spaniards against us, either in the West Indies or Europe, as Occasion might present; or whether, being drained through that Channel, of both their Men and Money, we might not more reasonably expect to be successful, in whatever was the Object of our Difference with the Court of Madrid? Besides, it cannot be supposed we can ever have a Land War with Spain, and there are but very few of our Men of War at present employed in Germany.

As I apprehend and hope (for the general Good of my Country) that these Suppositions of a Spanish War taking place are groundless, enough has been said to oppose the Opinion, that a German War would be an Obstacle to the success of a Spanish one, and I shall, with my Author, resume his Thoughts on our Prussian Alliance.

“ The Treaty in 1758 expires in the present Month, and cannot be renewed without the consent of Parliament. Let any Man read it, and then say, whether it be

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such

“ such an one, as that it can be suitable to the
 “ Dignity of the *British* Crown to revive
 “ it.—The Preamble pretends to say nothing
 “ more, than *that we want to give him Mo-*
 “ *ney, and we want a Treaty merely to make*
 “ *him take it.* If the second Article does
 “ not give us a Right to demand, for the
 “ Defence of the Electorate, the Troops
 “ raised with our Money, it is the most hu-
 “ miliating Treaty to be found in the *Bri-*
 “ *tish* Annals. If *we must deliver up our*
 “ *Money, could we not have given it him*
 “ *without a Treaty?* and such a Treaty
 “ too; as is even more mortifying in the
 “ Terms of it, than in the Expence of it :
 “ it is a Treaty which obliges him to no-
 “ thing ; in the modern stile, it has no reci-
 “ procity in it. We put it in his Power
 “ to keep us at War for ever ; and debar
 “ ourselves the Liberty, without his Consent,
 “ of making Peace with France, which he
 “ is not at War with, and therefore may be
 “ at Peace with when he pleases. The on-
 “ ly thing he promises, is, to pursue his own
 “ Quarrel, and not to make Peace with the
 “ Houses of Mecklenburg, Sazony and Au-
 “ stria,

“ *stria*, which, of all others, is is most for the
 “ Interest of *England* that he should not be
 “ at War with.”

If the Reader gives the least Attention to those Words marked with *Italicks*, it will be needless to add any Comment to answer this Passage, or point out the general Drift of Mr. *M-d-t*'s Reasoning, or shew that he sticks at nothing, however forced or unnatural, that may any the least way tend to support his favourite Hypothesis. Whether this Treaty be renewed or no, I shall leave to the Sagacity of Parliament to determine ; but with respect to its present Situation and Consequences, it may not be improper to observe, that the King of *Prussia* is equally bound, not to make Peace with our Enemies, as well as we are with his ; that the Queen of *Hungary* stands in the same point of View with regard to us, as the *French* King does with respect to them ; and if “ he may be at Peace with him when he pleases,” we may equally renew our Friendship with her, when it suits our Convenience ; that he has obliged himself to keep all Foreigners out of the Empire, by a prior Treaty, which

this renews; and that with regard to his opposing our interests or connections by continuing the Enemy of the House of *Mecklenburg*, to whom we are at present so nearly allied; this is confuted by the late measures, which have been taken, to restore a good understanding between the Courts of *Berlin* and *Mecklenburg*.

Our Author endeavours now to shew, that by discontinuing our Connections with the Continent, or in other Words endeavouring to prevent the balance of power in *Germany* being entirely destroyed, and the Liberties both civil and religious of the *German*, being totally subverted, will no way affect our Commercial Interests; for says he,

“ Sometimes the aid of Commerce is called
 “ in: and we are afraid that our Enemies
 “ will be all powerful upon the continent,
 “ and we shall lose our trade. Not as long
 “ as we can make our goods and keep our
 “ commodities. Even, our Enemies will
 “ buy them of us, as long as we can sell
 “ cheapest: and our friends wont take them
 “ when they become dearest. The *French*
 “ and *Flemings* at this time annually buy near
 300,000

“ 300,000 pounds worth of our Tobacco;
 “ and *Dunkirk, Havre, and Cette*, are now
 “ by that means our most profitable ports.
 “ Will *Hamburghers*, think we, refuse to
 “ take *Guadaloupe* or *Martinico* Sugars, be-
 “ cause both of those Islands are not in
 “ *French* possession.” No certainly, but if
Austria and *Frauce* are permitted to over-
 run *Germany* without assisting the *Germans*
 to oppose these tyrannical Ravagers; I be-
 lieve our Sugars, whether they come from
Guadalupe or *Barbadoes*, will be but ill paid
 for at the *German* Markets; and as to *Dun-*
kirk Havre and *Cette*, being our most pro-
 fitable Ports for the vent of Tobacco, is a
 proof that the continuation of the War even
 in *Germany*, does not prevent the *French*
 purchasing this commodity of us.

He must be a very shallow politician who
 can expect to carry on a thriving Trade with
 a ruined people, it is giving Credit to a Bank-
 rupt not compelled to make a composition;
 and surely Mr. M--d--t himself paints the
 present situation of *Germany* in such deplora-
 ble colours, that it would be only necessary
 to cite his own words to evince that the poor
 inha-

inhabitants are in many places at the last gasp, yet he imagines that they will not refuse to take our *Guadalupe* Sugars: Perhaps they may not, but surely he who understands the Nature of Commerce so well, would not consign a valuable Cargo, at this junction, to the *Saxons* or *Hanoverians*, in expectation of the returns he might have from those countries.

Having, as he imagines, fully proved that our Trading Interest can never be affected by the King of *Prussia* being crushed, and the Protestant Cause being subverted in *Germany*; he thus continues. " At other times the
 " *German* war is necessary as a Diversion;
 " we have for four years been spending
 " Twenty Millions to prevent the *French*
 " from succouring their Colonies, when
 " half the Troops and Treasure employed in this Diversion would two or
 " three years ago, have given such an irresistible superiority to our Fleets and Expeditions, as would have left our Enemies no colonies to succour. † "

I should be glad to know, what Colonies

† p. 60.

of

of any importance the *French* have left to succour, save *Martinico* and *Louifiana* * ; against the former of which, there is actually a formidable Expedition on foot, and in all likelihood, we may hear of the reduction of the latter next spring. But I should be glad to know, if the *French* had not strongly fixed their attention on *Germany*, and employed there so many Forces, they would not in all likelihood, still have been Masters of *Canada*, *Guadalupe*, and the other Possessions we have taken from them.

“ At other Times, our Compassion is applied to : we cannot leave these poor People to be cut up by the *French* ; to have their Country turned into a Desert : their very Apparel sold at Auction for their Contribution ; their Houses plundered, or pulled down for the Soldiers firewood, and the helpless Inhabitants exposed to starve, without covering or shelter.” †

I am sorry to find a Briton, who professes having the Good of his Country so much at Heart,

* As to *St. Domingo*, it would not be advisable at this Time to make a Descent there, without we proposed coming to an open Rupture with the Spaniards.

† P. 61.

Heart, disapprove of Compassion in favour, even, of our fellow Subjects, (for so we must in despite of all that can be said of them consider the Hanoverians) nay, when they have been reduced to their present Necessities and Distresses by our original Quarrel; for according to Mr. M--d--t himself they have no difference with France, nor any other power; and yet, after having by their Connections, been brought to the Brink of Destruction, he would leave them at the Mercy of *our* Enemies.

When a Man has long indulged himself in a Train of false Reasoning, and familiarize himself to erroneous Judgments, and rash conclusions; he is at length persuaded of their Rectitude, and urges them as incontrovertible Maxims. How else could we suppose the Author of the Considerations to Reason coolly, and without the least seeming Apprehension upon the French King's making himself Master of Hanover and gaining Seaports in the northern Ocean.

He might have added with very little more impropriety that ' Ireland is in danger, and ' the French King will make himself Master ' of Dublin and gain a Seaport in St.

George's

‘ *George’s Channel.*’ I do not know how such Reasoning may suit with the Meridian of the Readers of the Considerations and Thoughts upon the *German War*; but I am certain it would be very little relished amongst our Western Compatriots in that adjacent Island.

I have now gone through this Pamphlet, not in the Order the Author has digested it, but according to the best connection I could form between the different dissanalogous Parts; and I should look upon my Task as finished, if I did not find the interventive Piece, which he calls an *Addenda to the Considerations*, which though it has been before published, has not yet been taken notice of in a proper Manner.

Page 14. line 15. ‘ This Independency of the several *German States*, established by the Treaty of *Westphalia*, is what the *German Princes* call the Liberties and Constitutions of *Germany*.

‘ The guarding against any events, which may shake the Constitution, or overturn the System of the Empire; or, in other Words, the preservation of their own Independence,

E

may

' may be a very interesting Concern to the fe-
 ' veral *German* Princes in their own *German*
 ' Diet at *Ratisbon*, but was never made an
 ' Object of a *British* Parliament's Regard,
 ' till the End of the Year 1756 ; when by a
 ' fatal Mistake of a *French* Interest for an
 ' *English* one, it was proposed as a Motive
 ' for the present *German* War. The unnatu-
 ' ral Union of Councils abroad, the Calamities,
 ' which in Consequence of this unhappy Con-
 ' junction, may, by the Irruption of foreign
 ' Armies into the Empire, shake its Constitu-
 ' tion, overturn its System, and threaten Op-
 ' pression to the Protestant Interest there, are
 ' Events, which must sensibly affect the Minds
 ' of the Nation, and have fixed the Eyes of
 ' Europe in this new and dangerous Crisis.
 ' At that Time, when we first openly avow-
 ' ed the Cause of the petty *German* Princes,
 ' the Interests of *England*, and the Peace of
 ' Europe had always led us to wish rather to
 ' see some one great Power established in
 ' *Germany*, which should be the natural Ri-
 ' val of, and Balance against the Power of
 ' *France* *."

To wave entering into any Argument upon so delicate a nature as the *impropriety* (to make use of no harsher Term) of calling in Question, in this manner, the Motives of a Speech from the *British* Throne: it will be only necessary here to ask one single Question, to set this Matter in the clearest Light. Were the Subsidies granted by Parliament in the last War, to the Queen of *Hungary*, &c. given by the Legislature without considering their Application? or, whether those Grants being made knowingly to carry on the War in *Germany*, does not prove them (and consequently the Balance of Power in the Empire) to have been the Objects of a *British* Parliament's Regard?

He next takes Occasion to quote one of his former Adversaries who wrote in *French*, without seeming to differ with him in Opinion, in order to suppose him a *German*, and deduce the following conclusion.

‘ We have all of us, I suppose, lamented
 ‘ that our *German* friends have so long been
 ‘ making their *profit* of us; but it would have
 ‘ been more prudent surely for them to
 ‘ have concealed their Intending now, to

‘ plead Prescription, and make us their Property.’

In what Manner he designed to apply this I cannot pretend to say ; for in the first Place, it were great odds that a *German* did not write this *French critique* ; and, secondly, it is very unlikely, even if he were one, that he reaped any Advantage from our *German Alliances* ; and after all I don’t see how this same *prescription* is pleaded to make us their *property*.

His next Argument is to prove, that because the French have more Men in Germany than the English, we should even withdraw those comparative few to prevent the French having the least Obstacle to compass their Designs. This I believe requires no Answer.

‘ Page 76. The ordinary Revenue of the French, if they have seven Millions, will enable them on the present Plan of war, to bring more men into the field, without borrowing at all, than we can by getting every year eight Millions in debt.*

‘ * I have hitherto given what appeared, to me, to be much the most favourable

‘ turn

' turn to this Argument. But if my Anf-
 ' swerers choofe it, let us now ftate it in
 ' their light. The Revenue of *France*, we
 ' have again been told this Year, is but nine
 ' Millions: two of thefe are to arife out of
 ' Funds, which are already overburthened,
 ' and poffibly may therefore produce but
 ' one. Suppose then the whole to be eight
 ' millions. Let the half of thefe be taken up
 ' in the Maintenance of their civil Govern-
 ' ment, their fleet, their inland forces, and
 ' numerous Fortifications and Garrifons,
 ' through that vaft Extent of their Frontiers,
 ' *Spain, Italy, Germany, and Flanders*, and
 ' through their North and Weft Coaft from
 ' *Offend to Bayonne*. Befide this, notwith-
 ' ftanding all our Successes in the *East In-*
 ' *dies*, *France* has met us there, with a Su-
 ' perior one in every Engagement hitherto,
 ' by Sea, and Land; what then muft re-
 ' main out of thefe eight Millions for the
 ' Payment of *Swedish, Russian, and Ger-*
 ' *man* Subsidies, and the Maintenance of the
 ' War in *Germany*? We may make this soon
 ' as little as we please; yet the fact we know
 ' has been, that the *French* have every Year
 ' brought

' brought into the Field there, a number of
 ' Men greatly Superior to ours. My An-
 ' swers have assumed two Suppositions,
 ' which directly contradict each other; the
 ' one is, that *France* has much less than we,
 ' the other is, that it spends a great deal
 ' more. They are welcome to one of them;
 ' and to make their Choice of either; but
 ' the old maxim, *Nil dat quod non habet*,
 ' will not admit of their taking both.*

If the *French* have a less Revenue than
 we, it is no way impossible that they may
 enter into greater subsidiary Engagements,
 than *England*; for in the first place (though
 they may require a great Number of Troops
 to guard their frontiers) they have not such
 numerous Garrisons to support in all quar-
 ters of the World, as we, having
 scarce any Possessions out of Europe to
 guard: then, their fleet is neither an object
 of such great expence or attention, as ours;
 and, lastly, it does not follow, that, though
 they have entered into these Engagements,
 they have religiously fulfilled them. We

* p. 24.

know

know that they are at this time in arrears nearly Two Years subsidy with *Russia*, and that the Queen of *Hungary* has, more than once, in the course of this war, complained of the *French* not having fulfilled their promises: and to this may, in a great measure, be attributed the backwardness of the *Russians* to act, and the Jealousy and Distrust of the *Austrians*.

Next follow some curious Specimens of English boasting, which he puts into the mouth of any body who chuses to repeat them; for as yet I believe they remain unuttered by any but Mr. M-d-t. ' *France* is sinking; she knows herself sinking; this is the last Effort of a dying power; It is the convulsion of *Death*, the Effect of *Despair*: Let us but resist it firmly, let us act with the vigour of success, and we need not fear any thing she can do from *Despair*.'

' The War in *Germany* has given us Elbow room: The *Victory of Minden* has made way for the Conquest of *America*: the operations in *Germany* have given us the Elbow Room of a Year. *'

Upon these imaginary Declamations he makes the following Comment.

‘ Such was the confidence of our presumption, and such were the Flowers of Oratory, which shot up early the next Spring after the Battle of *Minden*. Yet with all that Elbow room, our British War was during that year totally languished : not a single squadron during Eighteen Months after failed for any new British Conquest ; nor was a single Brigade sent out in any other than a *German* service. Far from gaining Elbow room, our Arms have been pinioned down to the defence of *Hanover* : while the *French* were cramping our trade in the course of that year, more than in any preceding one, by their Privateers in our own seas, and the Martinicans were braving us to conquer them, and by taking two hundred and four ships, with the Privateers of that Island, were daily reminding us of the importance of making it ours.”

Had we been ingloriously defeated in the course of this War, had we lost all our capital possessions, had the *French* gained an entire ascendant over us, in a word, had we been

been reduced to the State our Enemies are, such Language and Declamation might have suited, with the Pen of an Anti-ministerial writer ; but, whilst we have continued adding every Year, during the War, one Conquest to another, and that even during the course of these very eighteen Months, here so emphatically mentioned, we reduced *Montreal*, and made ourselves Masters of all *Canada*, as well as *Pondicherry* in the *East Indies* ; it is surprising to think any man in his Senses can expect to be attended to by such subtle Sphistry.

The next Object is *again* the Expence of the Hessian Troops, which sorely affects him, but more particularly the 60,000*l.* which were made a present of to the *Landgrave*, to reinstate him in his Dominions ; and he endeavours to prove that we have paid 60,000*l.* more for the single *French* Word *Dedommagement* ; though, at the same Time, he tells us it was to furnish the *Landgrave*, with a reasonable Succour in Money. The Force of this Argument will I believe require no Comment, without the Reader should be inquisitive to know what he means by the Word

Dedommagement, which in plain *English* is nothing more than to make Good a Loss.

‘ One of my Answerers has said, *that France subsidizes more Powers than we do, and in all probable Conjecture at a much higher Price.* It would have been some consolation to us, if, instead of groundless Conjecture, we had produced an Instance of the French subsidizing to the half of this Height. We know the Rate of *Russian* Subsidies. Do the *Wirtemberg* rise the fourth of our *Hessian*? Will the French suffer that Duke to take their Money, while we take his Men? *

In answer to this, it will be necessary to take notice, that the Sums paid by *France* to her Allies, are not voted by Parliament, and that any *would be* intelligent Writer, has not the Opportunity of quoting the printed Votes as he may in *England*; from whence he may prove and disprove, just as he chuses to make his Addition and Subtraction agree for Hours together.

He then draws near the Conclusion of this curious Supplement, in saying, ' If the
 ' poor Sufferers (meaning the *Hessians*) are
 ' to have this Money, it were to be wished,
 ' at least, that it may not be distributed a-
 ' mong them till the End of the War. The
 ' giving it them now, will be only rendering
 ' them so much the more tempting a Bait
 ' for the *French* to come and eat them up
 ' again, and enabling the *Landgrave* to
 ' prove against us so much the greater Da-
 ' mages. It would be enriching the Ene-
 ' my at the *English* Cost, and inflaming our
 ' future Reckoning with the Loss of our
 ' Money. Far be it, however, from me to
 ' imagine, the Serene *Landgrave*, with his
 ' known Humanity and Tenderness, will not
 ' distribute it amongst the poor Sufferers;
 ' and farther still, that it was intended here,
 ' that he should put it all into his own Poc-
 ' ket. That would carry with it too much
 ' of the Idea of a Set of Protestants bargain-
 ' ing with a Popish Sovereign for the Ruin of
 ' his Protestant Subjects.'

I imagine he thinks that the *Germans*
 are so used to fasting, that they can very

well lay aside their Appetites till the end of the War; for, according to him, the poor Sufferers should not be relieved till then, though the War were to continue ten Years longer. If this Relief could be deferred so long, I believe, there would be no great necessity of giving it them then; and, indeed, according to this Gentleman's general good Opinion of the *German* Princes (which may easily be seen through his oblique Infinition) they stand a very poor Chance of having it at all, as he very charitably hints, by his negative Assertion, that the *Landgrave* will pocket it all. I am sorry to be obliged to take Notice of such poor Shifts to support an Argument, which, were it well grounded, would require no such paltry Props.

Having thus pursued him to the End of his Addenda, let us now sum up, in a few Words, the Tantamount of this Author's Arguments. He would have us desert the King of *Prussia*, because he imagines he can be no longer useful to us, without having the least grateful Sense of his former good Services—Conclude the War in *Germany* on our Part, by an *honourable* Retreat to *Stade*,
and

and there lay down our Arms, in order to submit *Germany*, and, particularly *Hanover*, to the Mercy of the *French* and *Austrians*.— Declare War against *Spain*, without any Provocation, to enrich the Proprietors of Privateers, at the Expence of the Nation's Honour and Riches.— Force the *French* to a Peace, without making them any Kind of Concession or Exchange, even for *Minorca*, no not even the small Island of *St. Peter's*, (scarce a fourth Part so large as the Isle of *Wight*) as it may hereafter be a Nursery for fifty Seamen, to man the Fleet which the *French* intend to build in about Two hundred Years. Grant the East-India Company what Sums they may require, to carry on their Monopoly to the greater Advantage to themselves, and the more Detriment to the Nation, by exporting so much more of our Bullion, in exchange for unwholesome Herbs, and useless Crockery-Ware.

Here is contained the Essence of his Arguments, and the Sum-Total of his well-digested System of Politics. How it may suit our present Notions of Gratitude, Honour, Success and Advantage, I cannot tell; but

but if ever it should take Place, I am apprehensive we shall find we have been frightened by a Bugbear, (or, to use our Author's Figure) a Spectre, the Spectre of the Considerations, from the pursuit of our Interests, as well national, commercial, as religious, to adopt such Measures as are the most incompatible with all our Professions and Advantages.

I believe it will be needless to add any thing more, in answer to the Thoughts and Considerations, as their Nature and Drift must by this Time be compleatly understood by every discerning and honest Reader.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

Page 9. Line 9. for *last* read *East*. P. 14. l. 4. for *Divisions* r. *Decisions*. P. 29. l. 9. after *without* add *our*. P. 27. l. 21. for *them* r. *him*. P. 28. l. 15. for *German* r. *Germans*. P. 30. l. 6. for *conjunction* r. *conjuncture*. P. 31. l. 9. after *Forces* add *whether*. P. 32. l. 14. for *familiarize* r. *familiarized*.